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While there is a growing body of theoretical and empirical literature examining 
the effects of such macroeconomic variables as growth of gross domestic 
product, international trade, incomes distribution and foreign direct investment 
on environmental pollution, one dimension lacking in the current literature is the 
impact of interest rates on pollution. If interest rates decline (rise), firms with 
capital-intensive technologies will invest more (less) relative to firms with labor-
intensive technologies. Additionally, according to Rybczynski theorem, in a situation 
of full employment and a competitive labour market, labor will shift towards the 
capital-intensive industries from labor –intensive ones. Consequently, the products 
of capital-intensive industries will expand (contract) relative to products of labor-
intensive industries. The capital-intensive industries are generally deemed to be 
polluting while labor-intensive industries are perceived to be non-polluting. This 
suggests that the movements of interest rates may have a discernible environmental 
outcome which has been neglected in the literature so far.  To begin to fill this gap, 
in this paper, we construct a two-good and two-factor closed economy model to 
show the impact of interest rates on environmental pollution in a formal way. The 
theoretical results of the paper are illustrated numerically.
1. Introduction
One of the key problems pervasive across societies today is an increasing 
level of  environmental pollution. How to reduce or control it has become the 
preoccupation of policymakers in many societies. There is a growing body of 
theoretical and empirical literature examining the effects of such macroeconomic 
variables as growth of gross domestic product, international trade, incomes 
distribution and foreign direct investment on environmental pollution. However, 
one important dimension lacking in the current literature is the effect of interest rate 
on pollution. The objective of this paper is to begin to fill in this gap by developing 
a model to analyze effects of interest rate on environmental pollution.
 Section one of the paper presents a brief overview of relevant literature 
to provide for a theoretical grounding of the study. Section two develops a model 
linking pollution to capital stock. Section three will provide the comparative static 
results with respect to changes in interest rates, together with hypotheses of the 
model. A numerical example of the model is provided in Section four. In the final 
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section, we summarize our main results, derive policy implications of the results 
and make suggestion for further research.
2.  Theoretical Underpinnings
 The literature on environment is multi-faceted and diverse. There is 
physical side of pollution–that is, how does pollution arise? And papers in this 
context have identified the contamination of air, water and soil. Within each source 
of pollution, a series of causes of pollution have been identified. For example, with 
respect to air pollution, the main sources are suspended particulates, lead, sulfur-
dioxide, carbon dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and ozone. And an estimate suggests that 
sixty-seven percent of air pollution arises from road transportation and industrial 
activities.
 The physical aspects of pollution involve issues such as acid rain and 
global warming and possible alternatives to each type of pollution but they do not 
focus on cost-benefit analysis. The cost-and-benefit analysis or economic approach 
to pollution has involved both micro and macro dimensions. At the micro level, 
the literature focuses on property rights and environmental externalities (Rauch, 
2005; Solakoglu, 2007),  project evaluation (Tol and Lyons, 2008), the estimation 
of social cost of pollution (Pearce, 2003), and economics of emission changes, 
marketable permits and carbon pollution taxes (Taiyab, 2006; Brown and Corbera, 
2003).
 The literature that has focused on macro-economic, political, social 
and globalization issues arising from the environmental pollution has been 
more voluminous. The most widely researched topic in this regard has been the 
relationship between pollution and per capita real income. The pioneering work 
was done by Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger (1995) who showed an inverse 
U-shaped relationship between a country’s per capita real income and its level 
of environmental quality. This came to be known as the Environmental Kuznet 
curve, EKC, hypothesis. The theoretical underpinnings of the EKC hypothesis 
are provided by the World Bank (1992) and Copeland and Taylor (2004), among 
others, while the empirical testing of the EKC hypothesis has been reported by 
many authors, including Frankel and Rose (2005), Huang, Lee and Wu (2008), 
Stern (2004), Harbaugh, Levinson and Wilson (2002). The empirical results on the 
EKC hypothesis have been mixed, differences arising from the types of pollutants 
studied, the sample chosen and the regression methodology used.
 With respect to the effects of trade on environmental quality, there have 
been two dominant hypotheses: (i) the trade-to-the-bottom hypothesis and (ii) the 
gains-from-trade hypothesis  (Frankel and Rose, 2005). The race-to-the-bottom 
hypothesis states that the open economies, particularly less-developed countries 
generally impose looser environmental regulation due to concern about international 
competitiveness, thereby inviting multinational corporations to invest in pollution 
generating industries (Ederington, 2007). On the other hand, the gains-from-trade 
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hypothesis argues that trade improves environmental quality by channels such as (a) 
trade raises income which, in turn, raises demand for environmental quality; (b) trade 
stimulates managerial and technological innovations in green technologies; (c) the 
multinational corporations import cleaner state-of-the art production technology; 
and (d) trade brings heightened awareness about environmental standards (Frankel 
and Rose, 2005; Copeland and Taylor, 2004; Gamper-Rabindran; 2006).
 There is also literature that links power and income inequality to 
environmental and health outcomes. There are three key findings coming out of 
this literature: one, there is a high correlation between power inequality and income 
inequality; second, the more unequal power or income is in a society, the lower is 
the environmental quality; and third, the poor segment of the society gains little and 
suffers the most from environmental regulation. The significant contributions in 
this strand of literature on environment have been made by Boyce (1994), Bullard 
(2000), Davidson and Anderson (2000), Ringquist (1998) and Torras (2005).
 Several authors have focused on recommendation of environmental policies 
for business and government in the world of imperfect markets, globalization and 
international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol (Tiemstra, 2003; Smith,1995; 
Rosser and Rosser, 2006; King and Mori, 2007; Copeland and Taylor, 2004). 
The non-economic dimensions of environmental damage and the environmental 
regulation formulation have been studied by Harrison and Sundstrom (2007) who 
analyze the comparative domestic politics of climate change; by Fisher (1971 ) who 
points out the ethical issues related to environmental degradation; and by Roberts, 
Grime and Manale (2003) who apply the world-systems analysis to locate social 
factors underlying the CO
2
 intensity of production within countries. 
 The objective of this study is to focus on an aspect that has been 
missing in the extant literature on environment, and that is the effect of interest 
rates on pollution. This effect can be established by the fact that capital projects 
spread economic costs and benefits over time and these costs and benefits need 
to be discounted back to the present for the economic analysis of these projects. 
Although there are some consumption-related environmental problems, pollution is 
dominantly a by-product of industrial activities related to production of goods and 
services. For example, transportation sector is the biggest polluter of air, coal and 
oil-fired generators; electric utilities are one of the biggest polluters of soil through 
acid rain; and industrial waste is the biggest polluter of waterways and oceans. 
All pollutions are intrinsically related to the use of capital stock. Although some 
capital is becoming non-polluting through upstart trending green technologies yet, 
presently, polluting capital stock is the most dominant in any typical economy in 
the world. 
Relating the level of pollution to capital stock, this paper will present a 
model linking the effect of variations in interest rates on the level of pollution. It 
will show an inverse relationship between the levels of interest rates and pollution. 
Secondly, it will show that the inverse relationship between interest rates and 
pollution is stronger in an economy that has the full employment of the labour 
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force. 
3.  A Formal Model
3.1 The Case of a Single Polluting Firm and a Single Non-Polluting Firm
 Initially we consider a single firm producing a good, call it X, and X is 
assumed to be capital intensive. The production function of X can be written as:
  X  = F (K,L)                                 (1)
 Where K = units of capital stock, and
                          L = units of labour.
  
 F will be assumed to be increasing, concave and homogeneous in inputs.
 Though some capital stock may involve green technology, the use of 
industrial/manufacturing capital stock generates pollution. For simplicity, we 
assume the capital stock is uniform and generates pollution level, Z, as follows1:
  Z  = G(K)           (2)
 Where    Z = units of pollution level
  G is an increasing function of K.
 It is assumed that for production of X, K is purchased upfront at price per 
unit  of $q. The use of L, however, is required in every period in the future and each 
unit of labour will cost wage rate of $w.
 The wage rate is a part of the private cost of production, but the generation 
of pollution which is an adverse externality involves the shadow price or social cost 
of pollution. We assume that the government accurately estimates this social cost 
and imposes pollution charge or pollution tax of $τ which is equal to this social cost 
of pollution per unit2. Thus, if a firm produces level of pollution Z, it will pay total 
pollution charges of τZ.
 It is assumed that firm’s capital stock produces perpetual streams of 
production of both X and pollution. The future net profits of the firm are discounted 
at the cost of capital, denoting r. r may be simply the borrowing rate, if the firm 
would finance all its operation by debt only or it is the weighted average cost of 
capital, reflecting the weighted average of individual sources of funds, where 
weights are the market value weights. In any case, what is important here is that r 
will be an increasing function of interest rates which will be the case whatever may 
be the formulation of the cost of capital. 
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 Using the assumptions above and the sale of X at $Px per unit, the value 
of a firm producing X, with given capital stock of K, is:
 Vx  = 1/r [PxF{K,L} – wL – τ Z] –qK          (3)
 The firm will choose K and L optimally by equating the present values of 
their marginal productivities with their respective present values of marginal costs. 
With respect to K, the optimality condition is:
  Vx/ ∂K  = 1/r [Px ( ∂F/ ∂K) - τ ( ∂Z/ ∂K)] – q =  0        (4)
 This states that at margin the present value of marginal product of capital 
which 1/r Px ( ∂F/ ∂K) must be equal to the sum of the price per unit of capital which 
is q and the present value of pollution tax or charges which is 1/r[τ ( ∂Z/ ∂K)]  The 
following diagram illustrates the determination of optimal K, denoted by K*, using 
equation (4).
     
 
         Diagram 1: Optimal Determination of Capital Stock, K*  
 
 Without any pollution charge, the diagram indicates that the optimal 
level of K would be Ko. With pollution charge of τ, the optimal capital stock 
becomes K* which is smaller than Ko.
 The level of total pollution generated by the production of X is given 
by:3
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      Diagram 2:  Level of Pollution due to Capital Stock
 Consider now a firm that produces a non-polluting product, call this 
product as Y. To be consistent with the non-polluting assumptions we have to 
assume that the production of Y is entirely labour-intensive, viz.,
  Y  =  H(L)              (5)
  Where H is increasing and concave in L.
 The production of Y has to be single-period as in the subsequent period 
new units of labour will be used for further single-period production. Assume the 
selling price of Y as $Py per unit, the value of the non-polluting firm is:
  V
Y
  =  1/(1+r)[P
Y
H(L) – wL}            (6)
 The optimality condition requires that
 1/(1+r) [P
Y
 ( ∂H/ ∂L)  - w)  =  0         (7)
 Or      P
Y
 ( ∂H/ ∂L)   = w
3.2 The Case of All Firms in the Economy
 It is assumed that total number of polluting firms in the economy is 
N
X
, and the total number of non-polluting firms is N
Y
. Within each class, firms 
are assumed to be identical. As compared to sub-section A above, there are three 
distinguishing features that emerge. Firstly, there can be an impact on input prices: 
w, τ and q if there will be a simultaneous expansion (contraction) of outputs X and 
Y. As a consequence, the level of pollution under this variable input prices situation 
will be different as compared to the situation of constant input prices. Secondly, 
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the situation of full employment or less than full employment of labour becomes 
critical for increase (decrease) of the level of pollution. Thirdly, the level of total 
pollution in the economy at a given point in time is equal to N
Y
Z*, where Z* is the 
level of pollution that corresponds to optimal K, K* in Diagram 1.
4. The Impact of Interest Rates on Pollution
4.1 The Case of a Single Firm
 We all know that interest rate fluctuate. While week-to-week fluctuations 
are less likely to affect capital expenditures of polluting firms, a durable decrease 
(increase) in interest rates is expected to raise (lower) investment expenditures.4 
Assuming a downward drift in interest rates, causing r to decline, that is d r < 0, 
firms demand for K rises, resulting an increase V
X
 as in the following equation: 5
 Given that d r < 0, the first term on the right hand side is positive. However, 
despite the fact that  ∂F/ ∂K  > 0,  ∂Z/ ∂K  >0,   < ∂K/ ∂r < 0 and d r < 0; the second 
term on the right hand side of (8) is zero due to the optimality conditions given in 
equation (4). However, for intra-marginal capital projects this term is positive and 
these intra-marginal projects span between K* and K**  in Diagram 3. 
  
  
           Diagram 3: Effect on Capital Stock due to a Decline in Interest Rates
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total NPV equal to the area of EAE´ in the diagram. It is only at point K**, the NPV 
of the marginal dollar investment is equal to zero. At point E′, the first term of the 
equation (8) is evaluated as K** level of capital stock.
 The upward shift of the PV of MNB
K
 curve indicates the fact that at lower 
interest rates, the discounted value of the net profits of the firm in the future rises. 
The new optimality point becomes E´ with corresponding optimal stock of K** 
which is higher than K*. At K**, there is the higher level of pollution and this rising 
pollution level explains the upward movement from E to E′ on the curve of the 
present value of total marginal cost of K. It may be noted that with zero pollution 
and/or no pollution charge or tax, the optimal level of K would have been K′. 
 Equation (8) assumes no induced effect of ΔK on labour services, L. But 
in practice, it is rare that a capital project , in addition to more K, will not involve 
more L. Incorporating this induced effect, equation (8) will expand involving the 
following additional term:
  
 1/r[P
X
 ( ∂F/ ∂L)  - w]  ( ∂L/ ∂K)  ( ∂k/ ∂r) d r            (9)
However, the first order conditions for optimality implies that for a marginal 
project, the contribution of this term to the incremental value of the polluting is 
also equal to zero.
 The effect of d r <0 on the value of a non-polluting firm arising solely 
from the fact that the discounted value of net profit over the period will be higher, 
although this increase will be substantially smaller than that of a polluting firm. 
Also, a non-polluting firm does not undertake capital investments because a decline 
in interest rates does not increase V
Y
 due to positive NPV projects.
4.2 The Case of All the Firms
       (i) The Scale Effect:   In the situation of all the firms in the economy, a 
decline in interest rates entails two additional channels of influence on the stock of 
capital and thereby on the total pollution level in the economy. Firstly, a decline in 
interest rate will induce demand for capital by all polluting firms and the aggregate 
incremental demand for k will raise its price of q. Secondly6, there will be an induced 
demand for labour and an upward pressure on the wage rate, w, will depend upon 
whether the economy is at full employment or it has unemployed labour force. 
In the full employment economy, the demand for labour by the polluting sector 
can be met only by a shift of labour from the non-polluting sector to the polluting 
sector a la Rybczinski theorem. Suppose total L is L in the economy. Then with full 
employment,
 L
X
  +  L
Y
   =  L          (10)
 Where L
X
   = employment in the polluting sector, and
                         L
Y
  = employment in the non-polluting sector
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 Which means that
           ΔL
X
   = - ΔL
Y
                       (11)
 In this situation the wage rate, w, will tend to rise. Also, the production in 
the non-polluting sector will shrink. However, if there is sufficient unemployment, 
then  ΔL
X
 can be taken from the pool of unemployed workers. As a consequence, 
there will not be a demand-driven increase in the wage rate nor will there be any 
decline in the output of the non-polluting sector. But, to the extent, the pool of 
unemployment will be sufficient to satisfy the increased demand for labour by the 
polluting sector, the wage rate will rise-- the increase in w will be lesser relative to 
the situation of full employment, and similarly, the output of the polluting sector will 
decline—the decrease will be lesser relative to the situation of full employment.
 The marginal project of each polluting firm will face variable input prices. 
The effect on the value of a polluting firm of a marginal project will now be given 
by:
( ∂Vx/ ∂r) d r =  ((-1/r
2)  d r) [P
X
 F(K,L) – wL – τ Z] 
               + [1/r {P
X
 ( ∂F/ ∂K) – τ (∂Z/ ∂K)} – ( ∂K/ ∂r) d r
         + 1/r[P
X
  ∂F/ ∂L – w] ( ∂L/ ∂K) ( ∂K/ ∂r)  d r
          - L/r {( ∂w/ ∂L) ( ∂L/ ∂K) ( ∂K/ ∂r)} d r
          - K {( ∂q/ ∂K) ( ∂K/ ∂r)} d r                    (12)
 The first three terms in equation (12) are the same as in equations (8) and 
(9) above while the last two terms reflect the upward pressures on input prices. 
The term involving ∂w/ ∂L  will be zero if there will be sufficient unemployed 
workers, otherwise it will be positive (with maximum value under full employment) 
preceding by the minus sign.
 
 The optimal conditions for the determination of K and L now become:
  
 1/r [P
X
 ( ∂F/ ∂K) - τ ( ∂Z/ ∂K)] - q – k ( ∂q/ ∂k)  =  0      (13)
    and
 1/r [P
X
  ( ∂F/ ∂L)  - w - L  ( ∂W/ ∂L)]   =  0       (14)
 Again, for an intra-marginal project, the NPV will be obtained from the 
last four terms of the equation (12) which will be positive but for the marginal 
project, the sum of these term will be zero as reflected by the optimality conditions 
(13) and (14). Diagrammatically, the determination of the optimal level of K is 
given as:
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 Diagram 4: Effect on Capital Stock of a Polluting Firm Due to
                        a Decline in Interest Rates in the Economy
Due to increased PV of marginal net benefit, and assuming no effect on the wage 
rate, w, the PVMNB curves shift to the right to PVMNB′. At the old level of q, the 
optimal level of K is K′. The rise in q shifts the PVMC´ curve upward to the left 
reducing optimal K to K″ from K′. If the wage rate would rise as it would be the 
situation of full employment, the PVMNB curve will shift leftward to PVMNB″. 
This shift will be somewhat smaller if there will be a pool of unemployed workers. 
The ultimate optimal level of K is K* which is lesser than under the situation of 
constant input prices. Equivalently, under the situation of a decline in interest rates, 
the pollution level will increase at lower pace in an economy where there is full 
employment. The total increase in pollution will be (G(K*) – G(K^)) x Nx, where Nx 
is the number of polluting firms in the economy.
(ii) The Composition Effect:   Subsection (i) above illustrates the scale effect on 
pollution, triggered by a decline in interest rates. The composition effect arises 
from the size of the polluting sector relative to non-polluting sector. This relative 
size can be measured by contribution of the sector to the gross domestic product, 
GDP. The GDP in our rudimentary economy is given by:
  GDP  =  NxPxX  +  NyPyY                      (15)
 Everything else be the same, if the larger is the relative size of the polluting 
industry, a decline in interest rates will generate a higher level of pollution. The 
reason for this result is simply this that the polluting sector is assumed to be capital 
intensive, capital stock is assumed to be source of pollution and a decline in interest 
rates expand capital investment.
(iii) The Technique Effect:   The polluting sector is assumed to use dirtier capital 
stock. If the technology of this sector were to change to use cleaner or green 
technology, the pollution level will tend to decline. A decline in interest rates will 
still stimulate capital investments but the use of green capital stock will be non-
  
 Diagram 4: Effect on Capital Stock of a Polluting Firm Due to 
   A Decline in Interest Rates in the Economy 
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polluting.   
 The theoretical analysis of the model proposes the following testable 
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Everything else the same, a decline in interest rates will trigger 
pollution in an economy where capital stock is assumed to be polluting.
Hypothesis 2: Everything else the same, a decline in interest rates will result 
in a higher level of pollution in an economy which is operating below full 
employment.
Hypothesis 3: Everything else the same, a decline in interest rates will lead to 
more pollution in an economy where the pollution charge or tax is zero or 
relatively lower.
 Hypothesis 4: Everything else the same, a decline in interest rates will result 
in less pollution in an economy where price per unit of capital is more 
sensitive to the demand for capital.
Hypothesis 5: Everything else the same, a decline in interest rates will trigger 
more pollution in an economy where the relative size of capital-intensive 
sector is larger.
Hypothesis 6: Everything else the same, a decline in interest rates will result 
in less pollution in an economy where cleaner capital stock is also used in 
production.
An elaborated numerical example will simulate the results of the model 
next.
5. A Numerical Example
A. The Case of a Single Firm
      (i) Polluting Firm  
 
       Assume: PX = $100 Per unit of X, w  = $12.949 per unit of L
  τ = $100 per unit of pollution, Z
  q = $1,333 per unit of K, r = 5%
  X  = F(K,L)    = 10K.5  +  L.8, and
  Z  = G(K)  =  K.
Then,
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 V
X
  =  1/.05[100{10K.5 + L.8} – 12.949 x L – 100K] – 1333 x K  (16)
 The first order conditions for optimality require that
 ∂ Vx/ ∂K  = 1/.05 [100 x .5K
-.5    - 100] – 1333  = 0,   and  
  
  ∂Vx/ ∂L   =  1/.05 [100 x .8L
-.2    - 12.949]        = 0     (17)
 
The system of equations in (17) solve for K =9 units  and L = 9,000 units. Thus 
the optimal levels of K and L for the polluting firm is  (K*, L*) = (9,000). The 
corresponding Vx and the level of a polluting firm is:
 V
X
*  = 1/.05 [100 {10 x 9.5 + 9000.8} – 12.949 x 9000 – 100 x 9] –  
             1333  x 9
        =  $612,743, and
 Z*   =  9 units of pollution
 (ii) A Non-polluting Firm
  Assume,
   P
Y
 = $30 and Y  = F (L) = 2L.8.
  Then
   V
Y
 = 1/1.05[30 x 2L.8 – 12.949 x L]     (18)
 The optimal level of  L is given by
        ∂VY/ ∂L  =   1/1.05[60 x 0.8L
-.2 – 12.949]      (19)
 This gives L* = 669.9 units.
 Thus
  V
Y
 = .9524 [30 x 2(669.9) .8 – 12.949 x 669.9
   =  $2,156.33
B.   The Effect of Interest Rate on Pollution
(i) The Case of Unemployed Workforce
In this situation, input prices are assumed to remain constant. Assume 
d r = -.01, that is the level of the discounted rate, r, becomes r = .04. 
Now,
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 V
X
  = 1/.04 [100 {10 x 10K.5 + L.8} – 
           12.949 x L – 100 x K] – 1333 K       (20)
Again, from the first order condition, similar to the system of equations 
in (17), except r is now 4% instead of 5%, the optimal levels of K and L become: 
K* = 10.635 and L* = 9000.54 units. The incremental demand for K is 1.635 units. 
This is the additional investment the firm undertakes. As a consequence of above 
changes, we have
V
X
  = 1/.04 [100 {100 (10.635).5 + 9000.54}.8 – 12.949 x 9000.54
100 x 10.635] – 1333  x 10.635– 
This gives V
X
  = $716,184. The new level of pollution is 10.635 units.
 As compared to the situation of r = 5%, the firm’s value rises by 
$156,441.
 As far as the non-polluting firm is concerned, its optimal L remains at 
669.9 units, but its market value rises to $2,177.02 due to a decline in interest 
rates.
(ii) The Case of Full Employment
 In this situation, input prices will tend to rise. We assume that
  d w/d r   = -30,  and
  d q/d r = -2000
 Given these assumptions, and noting that d r = -0.1, we have d w = -30 
x -01 = $0.3, and d q  =  (-2000) (-0.01)  = $20. Thus, the new levels of w and q 
become:
  w´  =  w +d w  =  12.949 + 0.3  = $13.249
  q´   =  q +  d q = 1,333 + 20  =  $1,353
 With all the previous assumptions and the new levels of w and q, the  
market value of the polluting firm becomes:
 
 V´´
X
  = 1/.04 [100 {10K.5 + L.8} – 13.249 x L – 100K] – 1353 K
 The first order conditions for optimality provide the optimal levels of K 
and L as K**, L** = (10.525, 8,026.65). It may be noted that the investment level 
shrinks somewhat and the use of labour declines. These results are consistent with 
the theory presented earlier in the paper.
 At the new optimal levels of K, L, V
X
 becomes $705,240. It is still higher 
relative to the situation of r = 5%, but the increase in V
X
 is somewhat less, as 
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expected. The level of pollution generated by the firm is now 10.525 units.
 At the higher wage rate, the use of labour by a non-polluting firm declines 
to 624.15 units—a decline of 45.74 units. And despite lower interest rates, the 
market value of this firm declines to $1,987.7—a $168.62 reduction.
6. Summary and Conclusions
 In this paper, we have argued that durable changes in interest rates affect 
the level of pollution in an economy. This effect is shown to arise from a realistic 
assumption that capital intensive production generates pollution, and declines in 
interest rates stimulate capital investment. We have proposed a theoretical model to 
study this effect. The model consists of two sectors: capital intensive or a polluting 
sector and labour intensive or a non-polluting sector. Some interesting results of the 
paper are: (i) A decline in interest rates will result in a lower increase in the level of 
pollution in an economy that is operating at or near full employment relative to an 
economy that is operating with unemployed labour force. (ii) A decline in interest 
rates will trigger less increase in pollution in an economy where input prices are 
more sensitive to input demands than in an economy where they are less sensitive. 
The model of the paper has suggested a series of testable hypotheses about the effect 
of interest rates on pollution. The next steps in our research are to do empirical tests 
of the suggested hypotheses of the model and, secondly, to extend the model to an 
open economy so that the cross-country variations in interest rates, differences in 
pollution charges, regulation, tax structures, industrial structures and input prices 
can be fully incorporated into the analysis.
Endnotes
1As noted in the previous section, pollution may be related to air, water or soil and within each category, there are 
multitudes of pollutants. It is most likely that some pollutants are more responsive to capital stock than others. 
However, we abstract from this detail here, and assume as if all pollutants are homogeneous.
2Research aimed at estimating the shadow price or social cost of per unit of pollution provide diverse estimates. 
Tol (2005) presents a survey of the literature on the estimates of the marginal damage cost of per ton carbon 
dioxide omission and finds a range of minus $4 to $,1666. Tol and Lyons (2008) report the current price of the 
European Trading System for carbon dioxide emission permits which ranged from Euro 33 to Euro .01 over the 
January 2006 and February 2008 period. In our static model, we assume the social cost per unit as simply $τ .
3For ease of calculations in the numerical section of the paper, we assume function G in equation (2) as a simple 
linear function.
4Interest rates in the developed countries generally rose from late 1960s to 1981 and subsequently, generally fell 
until 1992. Interest rates again rose, but modestly, from 1992 to 2002, and since 2002 interest rates have been 
basically stable.
5An increase in r, that is d r > 0 will have opposite effects to those which arise with respect to d r < 0.
6We are assuming that τ is a pollution charge or tax imposed by the government. If τ were to be interpreted as the 
price of marketable pollution permits, τ will also be affected as an increase in K will cause more firms to demand 
for pollution. Here we assume τ to be fixed.
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